Global Obligations and the Human Right to Health by Wringe, Bill
Forthcoming in Kendy Hess, Violetta Igneski and Tracy Isaacs (eds): Collective Obligations – Ethics Ontology and Applications (provisional title) – Rowman and Littlefield – forthcoming 2018





Global Obligations and the Human Right to Health
Bill Wringe, Bilkent University, ANKARA

	Those who argue for the existence of collective obligations are sometimes challenged to explain why the question of whether there are any such obligations might matter from a practical point of view. One way of introducing the objection is to focus on questions of agency. In order for things to get done, individuals have to do them. Those who believe that there are collective obligations typically argue that obligations on collectives give individuals who are members of those collectives reasons to do things. And those who deny that there can be objectives falling on collectives then argue that the view is, in important respects, no different from a view on which obligations fall on individuals directly.
	One way of addressing this objection is to show how appeals to collective obligations can have an important explanatory and/or clarificatory role. I have pursued the strategy of explaining how collective obligations can have a role of this sort, both in general terms and in relation to one particular debate, namely the debate about whether there can be subsistence rights.​[1]​ Here I attempt to extend that strategy, by showing how an appeal to a particular kind of collective obligation - a collective obligation falling on an unstructured collective consisting of the world”’s population as a whole – can be used to undermine recently influential objections to the idea that there is a human right to health which have been put forward by Gopal Sreenivasan and Onora O’”Neill.​[2]​

1: Some Preliminaries
	First some preliminary ground-clearing. For reasons of space, there are several issues I shall not address in this paper; and there are others which are closely related to, but nevertheless distinct from, the issue which I wish to focus on here. First, I shall not have a great deal to say about the positive case for thinking that there is a human right to health: I shall merely note two things. First, an impressively wide range of human rights instruments make reference to some kind of right to health.  Secondly, many of the rationales to which theorists typically appeal in justifying claims that human beings have rights of some sort or another seem capable of being adapted in such a way as to make a preliminary case for recognizing a right to health. These points don’t conclusively establish the existence of a right to health, for they could not, show that every argument designed to show that there cannot be such a right must fail. Nevertheless, they seem sufficient to justify us in regarding it as a starting point for further investigation. 
	Secondly, I shan’t here be concerned with the exact content of a moral right to health: that is, the question of exactly what the human right to health is a right to.​[3]​ Although this is an important issue, the arguments for skepticism about the human right to health that I shall be addressing are not sensitive to the nuances of exactly what falls under that right. They are intended to show that there could be no moral right falling within the general area in which a right to health is supposed to fall. Showing that the existence of such a right can’t be ruled out by relatively straightforward general considerations about rights and health seems both worthwhile for its own sake and is arguably a helpful first step in the necessarily complex task of delineating the precise content of a right to health. 
	Finally, I shall not address the question of whether or how a right to health should be institutionalized in International Law. The fact that I have appealed to the recognition of such a right in international human rights instruments might seem to commit me to taking a stand on this issue.​[4]​ However although I regard a right’s being recognized in human rights instruments as being evidence for its existence, I don’t see its recognition as constituting that existence. Furthermore the evidence in question is defeasible. The human rights regimes of which human rights instruments are a part, are a kind of political institution. Like other kinds of political institution they are subject to criticism of various kinds, including moral criticism. They are in principle capable of getting things wrong. 
But even if we think, on balance that they have not got things wrong, it doesn’t follow that in saying so we need necessarily be committed to the existence of a moral right to health care. The existence of a moral right to health is neither a sufficient nor a necessary condition for thinking that such a right should be institutionalized in international law. One might argue for the recognition of a right to health under International Law on other, non-rights based grounds. For example, it might be that – as Allen Buchanan has argued – the best way to justify the incorporation of particular rights within International Law is on broadly utilitarian grounds and that - as he has not argued -that the existence of a right to health can be justified on precisely these kinds of grounds.​[5]​
	
	2: What the Existence of a Right to Health Need Not Entail 
	The claim that individuals have moral rights to health need not necessarily be understood, primarily and in the first instance, as a claim about rights to the provision of healthcare to specific individuals. At least some of what falls under this right might be secured in other ways than via the provision of healthcare: for example, via measures which constrain actions and projects that might be noxious to the health of others (such as say, measures outlawing or constraining the operation of manufacturing processes which pollute the environment in which others live) or via measures which target what are sometimes called the “social determinants of health”. Nevertheless it seems plausible that the existence of a moral right to health will place some constraints on the distribution of healthcare resources. Since constraints of this sort arise from considerations of rights, it seems natural to think of them as considerations of justice, and in particular considerations of distributive justice. 

	This point does not entail, and should not be confused with any of the following, stronger claims:

A) All claims about just distribution of health depend on claims about rights to health.;
B) Rights to health are the fundamental basis for discussions about the just distribution of healthcare.;
C) The most urgent issues to be addressed when considering injustices in the distribution of healthcare are involve the satisfaction of rights.

A, B, and C all entail the existence of rights to health. However, the existence of a right to health does not entail any of A, B or C. We might think of the existence of rights to health as setting a baseline constraint on the distribution of healthcare resources, while accepting the existence of constraints of justice on other aspects of healthcare provision that are not understood as deriving from a right to health. There will be such further constraints if we accept, for example, the following set of views: that some important health-related goods, such as the provision of herd immunity from infectious diseases via programs of vaccination are public goods; that public goods are not best understood as goods to which individuals have rights; and that the provision of such goods can be required by constraints of justice.​[6]​ 
Considerations of this sort should lead us to reject A. If we further accept that the provision of herd immunity via programs of vaccination constitute a significant part of a state’s duties to provide healthcare to its citizens, we should also reject claim B. And if we think that the institution of vaccination programs in some of the world’s poorest countries are among the most urgent interventions that we should pursue in the field of global public health, then we will have to reject claim C.​[7]​ 
Does the existence of a right to health which entailed entails none of A-C have any practical significance? It does.  Consider the following claims. 

RA: Individuals should have rights of access to whatever public healthcare system is available ;
DM: Sufficiently wealthy states have duties to provide duties of minimal, universally accessible provision to those living in remote areas,;
RE: Individuals have a claim right to the basic elements of a minimally healthy environment, such as an unpolluted supply of water and air, opportunities to take physical exercise in safe surroundings and so on.

	These claims are not toothless. In many countries, including many Western liberal democracies, members of marginalized communities cannot take for granted that they will be generally accepted. Yet each of RA, RE, and DM might be seen as claims which can be derived from the existence of a human right to health, or as partial specifications of what this right amounts to. Since none of them require the truth of any of A-C, denying A-C need not evacuate the right to health of significant content. ​[8]​

3: Correlative Obligation Bearers for the Right To Health  

 I shall now address an argument which is intended to show that, however we might conceive of its content, there cannot be a human right to health. This argument may seem fairly familiar. However, the fact that it is still being pressed in the literature on the right to health suggests they areit is still worth addressing
 
	The arguments I am addressing depends on the following pair of claims:

             CDB 1: If there is a right to health then there must be a correlative duty-bearer. 
	CDB 2: the The correlative duty-bearer must be the state (at least, in the first instance).    

	CDB 1 and CDB 2 both appear initially plausible. Some have doubted CDB 1.​[9]​ But as O’Neill has emphasized, if we reject it we run the risk of letting the right to health degenerate into a mere ‘manifesto right’ rather something which calls for specifiable actions from particular individuals or agencies.​[10]​ One might deny, as Amartya Sen has, that all rights must call for action in this way: perhaps it is sufficient for the existence of right that it give rise to reasons which need to be given some weight in some contexts of decision.​[11]​ However, it is hard to deny that rights that call for action by some agent have a more far-reaching political resonance than those that do not. So we might hope to be able to retain it.
	CDB 1 does not entail CDB 2. Indeed, I shall argue later that we should accept CDB 1 while rejecting CDB 2. Nevertheless, the implausibility of other potential candidates for being the correlative obligation bearers of which CDB 1 speaks may make it seem extremely attractive. Possible alternatives might include, alongside states, individuals, international NGOs, and what Matthias Risse calls ‘the global political order’.​[12]​ However, as Wolff says, it seems overwhelmingly more plausible to think of the obligations generated by a right to health as falling on states than it does to think of them falling on individuals. As he suggests, it is highly counter-intuitive to suppose that any of the duties generated by the existence of the rights to health of Brazilians to generate duties falling on Sri Lankans resident in Sri Lanka.​[13]​ There are also seem good reasons for ruling out international NGOs as being the relevant obligation bearers: admirable as their work is in many contexts, they are typically too poorly resourced, and equipped to deal with too narrow a range of issues to be capable of discharging the full range of duties associated with any plausible account of the right to health (as reflection on RA and RE from Section II quickly confirms).​[14]​
	What of Risse’s ‘global order’? Risse holds that our rights of common possession of the earth’s resources can be seen as generating claims not against one or other state but against the set of political institutions and agencies that allow for the existence of states. We hold this right precisely because having such a right is under existing institutional circumstances constitutive of our being co-owners of those resources. To lack such rights would be to have been deprived of (or, perhaps, to have forfeited) our innate right of common ownership. 
	According to Risse, a right’s being held against a global political order is constitutive of it’s being a human right. But as Risse himself observes, it seems highly implausible that the existence of a right to health could be derived from our rights of shared ownership over the earth’s resources. One might nonetheless wonder whether healthcare rights could be held against a global order on some other basis. And the problem with this suggestion is that in this case – unlike say, the case of a right to access to water, or to basic subsistence goods – the global political order appears as just one potential obligation-bearer among many. This being so, picking it rather than any other potential obligation-bearer as the bearer of precisely those obligations whose existence is implied by the truth of CDB 1 seems unsatisfactorily arbitrary. 

4: Against States as Correlative Duty Bearers
	Elimination of other candidate obligation bearers may then seem to establish the truth of CDB 2. But as I shall now argue, accepting CDB 2 seems deeply problematic. One fairly obvious reason, is the existence of stateless individuals. Still, we might hope that we could accommodate this, at least in theory – though perhaps not entirely satisfactorily in practice - in a way consistent with the overall thrust of CDB 2, by assigning the correlative obligations arising out of the healthcare needs of stateless individuals to some kind of interstate organization, and imposing on states a duty to support such institutions as, for example, a condition of having the right to exclude such individuals from access to their territory.  
	A further problem with CDB 2 has been raised by Sreenivasan: if there is a human right to health, then it seems as though what people have a right to demand from their states in virtue of this right should not vary enormously depending on which state they happen to be a citizen of; that states differ enormously in their resources; that – on pain of violating the “ought implies can” principle poor states cannot have a duty to devote more resources to meeting the healthcare needs of their citizens than they  actually possess; and that it is plausible that richer states have a duty to devote more of their resources to meeting the health-related needs than poorer states are capable of doing. ​[15]​
	The argument against CDB 2 is, in effect, that the following three claims are all highly plausible.  Sreenivasan makes his point vivid by focussing on a particualr figure – 17 US dollars per person per year – that he takes to be the amount that one conspicuously poor state, namely Eritrea,   is in a position to devote to meeting the healthcare needs of its citizens.​[16]​ He argues, against this background, that thee follwing three claims are all oveerwhelmingly plausible:

	H1: Some poor states are not able to afford more than merely minimal provision;
	H2: States can’t have a duty to provide what they can’t provide;
H3: States which are substantially better off than Eritrea have a duty to provide a level of healthcare provision amounting to more than 17 dollars per yearday to their citizens.​[17]​

However, the combination of H1, H2 and H3 seems obviously incompatible with EQ:

EQ:  what people can demand, in virtue of a human right to health from their states with respect to healthcare should be roughly equal, no matter where they come from.

	Since the interest of the argument depends in part on the initial plausibility of H1-3 and EQ, it is necessary to say something about each of them. My diagnosis of Sreenivasan””’s position will involve casting an especially skeptical eye on EQ. If we reject it, then clearly the argument falls apart. However, I shall also argue that we cannot plausibly reject EQ by itself. A convincing rejection of EQ will require us to reject CDB 2 as well. So it is worth being clear why EQ might seem compelling if we are already committed to CDB 2.  

     It’s natural to think that it follows from something’s being a human right that it is a right that one has simply in virtue of being human. It is a small step from this to suggestss that the extent to which one can demand that it be fulfilled should not depend on contingent facts such as, say, one’s nationality. And if the only agent on which one can make a claim is one’s state, then EQ seems to follow fairly straightforwardly. Matters become slightly more complicated once one starts talking of states being primary obligation bearers, since this seems to allow for the possibility that there might be secondary obligation bearers on whom one might make a claim instead. Nevertheless, the notion of a secondary obligation-bearer is naturally understood as being the notion of some agent on whom one has a claim when and because a primary obligation bearer fails to fulfil their obligations for some reason or another. If so, then allowing for secondary obligation bearers does not undermine the case for EQ. (And we should note that in any case, while the notion of a secondary obligation bearer is an natural one in this context, Sreenivasan makes no appeal to it.)    
          One might object that this line of argument requires us to think of the right to health – and perhaps of human rights more generally - as natural rights. Some argue that it is perverse to do so.​[18]​ But this point , , provides no help in this context. For whilewhile even if it provides us with good grounds for rejecting EQ, it does so only by giving us reasons to be skeptical of CDB 2, and indeed CDB 1. It does not provide us with a reason for rejecting EQ in a context where CDB 2 is taken for granted.  
	This being so, we need to consider H1-3 in more detail. Start with H1. Sreenivasan makes much of the figure of 17 dollars per capita per annum, which he says is the maximum amount of money that the Eritrean government is in a position to devote to meeting the healthcare needs of its citizens. The apparent precision of this figure is presumably somewhat spurious: it surely depends on a range of potentially contentious assumptions about what else the Eritrean state needs to spend money on; what resources it has at its disposal; and so on. But let us assume, for now, that something like this figure is correct. 
	H3 may seem straightforwardly true. If so, this is presumably because we think that 17 dollars per capita per annum, is a mere drop in the ocean in relation to the provision required to meet the health-related needs of citizens of advanced industrialized countries, and that on any account of healthcare justice, such states are likely to have a duty to provide considerably more healthcare than the seventeen dollars per capita per annum. However, A3 only follows from these considerations if we think that the human right to health is the only basis on which a citizen of a state might make a justice-based claim to health-care against their state. 
	Some defenders of the existence of a human right to health may see it as playing this kind of role. Indeed, we might expect anyone who accepts one of the theses A-C to think something like this. But we have already seen that there are reasons for rejecting each of A-C. ​[19]​ Someone who believes in the possibility of alternative bases for justice-based claims to health-care may nonetheless regard the human right to health as underpinning a less extensive set of justice based claims available to the citizens of any state.       
	So the case for H3 is less straightforward than it might initially seem. Nevertheless, it seems defensible. The most plausible way of defending it is, I think, to appeal to the idea that a claim such as RE can be derived from the existence of a human right to health. For in many cases securing the derivative rights mentioned in RE is likely to require an investment on the part of a state of considerably more than 17 dollars per capita per annum. Notice, however, that if H3 is defended in this way we cannot simply read off from the truth of H3 and EQ the truth of a claim committing other states to expenditures of more than 17 dollars per capita per annum. For it may be that there are substantial differences in the costs of securing the kinds of access to a minimally healthy environment that RE speaks of in different countries. Still, securing the appropriate level of access may well demand more than can be reasonably expected of some particularly poor states. This will be enough to secure the conclusion that the opponent of CDB 1 requires.     
	H2 may also seem straightforward, at least at first sight. It appears to be nothing more than an instance of the familiar Kantian claim that “ought implies can”. Of course, that principle is itself contested. But two other issues seem worth noting. The first is concerns the kind of thing that can be the subject ofthe nature of the “can” involved in the formulation in question. It is typically - though not always - assumed that the “ought implies can” principle applies, at least in the first instance to agents.​[20]​ Someone who appeals to the “ought implies can” in this context to defend H2 is then, presumably committed to viewing states as (collective) agents; or alternatively to regarding a collective version of the claim as being a corollary of an equally plausible claim formulated at the level of the individual. 
	A second issue to consider is the kind of possibilitynature of the “can” involved here. Someone who takes the argument outlined here seriously would presumably not take it as being undermined if it turned out that poor states had the means and resources to go to war against a neighboring state for the purposes of unjustly appropriating resources which would enable them to devote more than 17 dollars per capita per annum to meeting the health care needs of their citizens. The key word here is, of course, “unjustly”. It is much less clear that we ought to say of a state whose limited levels of resources can be explained in terms of their unjust treatment over a period of several generations that it does not owe it to its citizens to make efforts to regain resources which it might be able to devote to meeting the healthcare needs of its citizens. 
	We might regard the idea that poor states could, in general, put themselves in a position to devote more generous resources to the healthcare needs of their populations by making war-like attempts to recover resources that have been unjustly expropriated from them under an unjust colonial system as a bizarre fantasy. But it is not bizarre to dispute the idea that the legitimate claims of individuals against states that have been the victims of economic injustice should be limited to what those states are now, as a result of injustice, capable of paying. 
What we need to notice in this context is that the most plausible version of a principle like CDB 2 is one that identifies states as the primary bearers of correlative duties, rather than the only such bearers. “Primary” here has a technical sense. It does not simply mean that states are the most important bearers of such obligations (though someone who subscribes to CDB 1 will presumably agree that they are.) It means that they are the duty-bearers in the first instance. It is compatible with this formulation of CDB 2 that these obligations devolve on other obligation-bearers in certain circumstances: for example, situations in which the primary obligation-bearer is unable to discharge the obligations that they would have as a result of unjust treatment by one or more identifiable agents. (In particular, it is compatible with CDB 2 that in those circumstances the obligations in question devolve on these agents.)    
	 We might regard this as an objection to H2. We might take it that in the situations envisaged states had obligations to provide healthcare that they were unable to provide, and that these unfulfillable obligations gave rise to an obligation on other states that had treated them unjustly to step in and remedy the situation. Where the unjustly treated state is able to compel reparative action this will not be a counterexample to H2. But where it is unable to do so, we may still want to say that the agents who have acted unjustly are under some kind of obligation to those whose healthcare needs have to be met. We might think the best way of explaining why this is so is to take their obligation as being grounded in the pair of facts that the state has an obligation, and the identifiable agents who have treated it unjustly have made it unable to meet this obligation.  
	Those who wish to insist more strongly on the plausibility of the ‘ought implies can’ principle might suggest understanding the idea of a secondary obligation slightly differently. On this account a secondary obligation arises when a primary obligation is unable to discharge obligations that they would otherwise have, but which they do not in fact have, because they would be unable to discharge them. However, this proposal involves understanding the notion of a secondary obligation bearer in a way that is rather different from the way I suggested it should be understood in our initial discussion of EQ, and indeed in a way which is incompatible with that principle.
	The upshot of this discussion of H1-H3 is as follows. If we formulate CDB2 in a way that makes no reference to the possibility of secondary obligation-bearers, then it gives rise to a version of EQ that  is incompatible with H1-H3. If we formulate CDB 2 more plausibly, and in such a way as to allow for the possibility of secondary obligation bearers, then either EQ is incompatible with H1-H3, or we need to understand the notion of a secondary obligation-bearer in a way that is incompatible with the truth of EQ. At this point the moral might seem clear: we should avoid formulations of CDB 2 which make no reference to the possibility of secondary obligation bearers, and we should accept a conception of secondary obligations which undermines EQ. If we do so, we seem able to accept a version of the “ought implies can” principle for collective agents.   
	However, this is not the end of the story. The viability of this account seems to depend quite heavily on the availability of secondary obligation bearers. If so, we need an account which tells us who the secondary obligation bearers might be in the case of a human right to health, and of how the burdens arising as a result of the existence of states which were unable to discharge obligations that they would otherwise have ought to be allocated. It is far from obvious how these questions are to be answered. ​[21]​ So those who wish to defend the existence of a human right to health may wish to consider an alternative possibility. 
	  
5: An Alternative – Correlative Obligations As Global Obligations
The arguments we have considered give us good reasons for rejecting CDB 2. As we saw in Section III, CDB1 does not entail CDB2: the argument from CDB 1 to CDB 2 involved eliminating a variety of other candidates for being correlative obligation-bearers. The line of argument I wish to explore involves considering an alternative, and often overlooked, candidate for being a correlative obligation bearer. The suggestion is fairly straightforward: it is that we should think of the correlative obligation bearer as being “everyone”. Given that the suggestion is this straightforward, we might wonder why it has been overlooked in the literature on the right to health (and indeed, rights more generally.) The answer, I think, is that it has been generally supposed that an answer of this sort cannot possibly work. But I shall argue that many of the considerations that have been thought to show this are considerably less powerful than they are typically taken to be. 
	Before I can address these considerations, however, it will be helpful to spell out the suggestion in more detail. I start by drawing attention to an important distinction which is often overlooked. It is a distinction between two ways of talking about groups of individuals, or as philosophers say, predicating things of them. When we predicate, we attribute a feature to something. Sometimes when we predicate something of a group, we do so in a way that entails that each member of the group has that feature. When I say of a class of students that they are eligible for military service, I am attributing the feature in this way: I am saying that each of them is so eligible. If I say that they are delightful to teach, I may be doing the same thing: I may be saying that each of them is a delight. But I may be saying something a bit less committal. I may be saying that taken as a group, they are delightful, even though the group itself may contain some less delightful members. In fact, it may be that none of the students on their own is delightful to teach: perhaps what is delightful about them is the way they interact with one another in a class-room setting. Predications of the first sort are known as “distributive”, predications of the second sort as “non-distributive.”
	The claim that everyone is the bearer of the correlative obligations arising out of the human right to health can be understood either distributively or non-distributively. Understood distributively, it is implausible: on this reading each individual has many obligations which they are unable to satisfy. But the proposal might also be understood non-distributively. So understood, it is not so obviously absurd (or at least, not for the same reasons as it is on the distributive reading). I shall argue that is very far from being absurd: it is a claim which the defender of the human right to health should accept, and it helps us to see where Sreenivasan”’s skeptical arguments go wrong. In defending this view, I shall sometimes talk of the “global collective”, as being the bearer of the obligations correlative to the human right to health. Language of this sort may seem metaphysically extravagant: it may appear to commit me to the existence of some determinate entity about whose existence one might be skeptical. 
	However, talk of a global collective need not be understood in this way. I intend it to be understood in such a way as to commit me to as much or as little, ontologically and metaphysically as the claim that such obligations fall on everyone, read non-distributively, does. In particular, it is important to note that the claim that these objections fall on a global collective should not be understood as the claim that these obligations fall upon a global collective agent. For, it might plausibly be objected, on many conceptions of collective agency, there is little reason for thinking that a global collective agent must exist. So the proposal under consideration involves the idea of obligations falling on collectives which are not agents.     
	The claim that the global collective is the bearer of correlative obligations arising out of the human right to health is not the same as Risse”’s proposal, mentioned in Section III, that such obligations should be seen as falling on the “global political order”. On Risse”’s proposal, the existence of a global political order depends on the existence of certain relationships of power and authority between different political entities. While its existence might not be seen as depending on the existence of precisely relationships which are currently in force, its existence is, presumably to some extent, a contingent matter: there are ways in which history could have unfolded in which nothing that we would want to describe as a global political order would have emerged. By contrast, the existence of a global collective is not something which I take to be contingent in the same kind of way as the existence of one of a range of political arrangements.     

6: Developing the Global Obligations Account: Concerns About Agency	
The idea that the global collective can be seen as a bearer of obligations correlative to the human right to health provokes considerable skepticism. Much of this skepticism centers on concerns about agency. In fact, it is helpful to distinguish two related, but distinct kinds of concern here. One is whether it makes sense to see collectives which are not agents as obligation bearers at all. Call this the “Metaphysical Worry”. A second worry concerns arises from concerns about whether the global collective can be the bearer of the particular kinds of obligations to which a human right to health might be thought to give rise. Call this the “Politico-Practical Worry”.  
	Elsewhere I have argued that we should not be over-troubled by the Metaphysical Worry.​[22]​ Here I shall focus on the Politico-Practical Worry. It is motivated by the thought that even if we allow that the Global Collective could in principle be an obligation bearer, the bearer of the obligations correlative to the human right to health needs to meet a range of further constraints which are imposed by the idea that rights are the kind of things which. by their nature, issue in specific demands on identifiable agents. The suggestion that the Global Collective could be the bearer of the obligations correlative to the human right to health identified in CDB seems unsatisfactory in this respect, since it is not clear whether it will follow from the Global Collective”’s being under such obligations that any identifiable individuals will have any identifiable duties to do anything about anyone”’s health. Indeed, it may seem as though nothing of this sort could follow if, as I have suggested, the claim that such obligations fall on a global collective is simply equivalent to the non-distributive reading of the claim that these obligations fall on everyone. For it might seem as though the non-distributive nature of this claim is precisely what blocks it from giving rise to specific obligations on identifiable individuals.  
	There are, however, two points we should note here. The first is that it is not immediately clear how far someone who thinks that states are the bearers of the obligations arising out of the human right to health can push this objection. For from that claim alone, nothing follows about the obligations of any particular individual. This by itself is not typically thought to be a compelling objection to CDB 2. It is worth considering why not. The answer is presumably that we are typically willing to assume – at least for the purpose of theorizing about human rights - that we have a clear, if partly inchoate idea of how obligations on states might give rise to obligations on individuals. The second significant point is that although the non-distributive nature of the claim that the obligations correlative to the human right to health fall on everyone blocks us from inferring that the same obligation falls on each individual, it does not follow from this that no inferences about the obligations of individuals can be made from it. This suggests that the point about the Politico-Practical worry should not be seen as a knock-down objection to the idea that the obligations arising out of the human right to health falling on the global collective, but as presenting a challenge. The challenge can be met if we can explain how the existence of obligations falling on the global collective could give rise to obligations falling on particular individuals. 
	Elsewhere I have argued that global obligations give rise to obligations on individuals to support certain kinds of institution.​[23]​ In particular, I have argued for two principles about the ways in which obligations that fall on an unorganized collective, such as the global collective can generate obligations on the individuals who make up that collective. 
OP 1: A stringent obligation which falls on a collective, and which can only be fulfilled by collective action of a sort that is unlikely to come about in a spontaneous and uncoordinated manner generates an obligation on each of the members of that collective to promote modes of organization that would enable the obligation to be carried out, to the extent that it is in their power to promote such forms of obligation.
OP 2: A stringent obligation which falls on a collective which is organized in such a way as to enable the co-ordination of collective actions that satisfy global obligations generates a pro tanto obligation on individuals who form part of that collective to act in ways which are necessary for the fulfillment of those obligations.
			If we are willing to regard the obligations arising out of the human right to health as stringent obligations, and if we also think, as is surely plausible, that this these obligations is are unlikely to be fulfilled by spontaneous uncoordinated actions, then the antecedent of OP 1 is satisfied. OP 1 itself then entails that individuals have an obligation to promote modes of organization that will allow the obligations arising out of the human right to health to be satisfied. And OP 2 entails that if such modes of organization exist, individuals have a duty to act in ways enabled by such modes of organization and which would enable the obligations arising out of the human right to health to be satisfied. It thereby, shows, at least schematically, how the obligations correlative on the human right to health could give rise to specific obligations on falling on identifiable individuals.  
	The proposal is, as I have noted, schematic. It is unlikely to seem completely satisfactory in the absence of a more detailed specification of what the required forms of organization might look like. Someone might nevertheless worry at this point that in the absence of any determinately worked out scheme for distributing obligations correlative to the human right to health from the global to the individual level we are in no position to assess whether any such scheme is workable. It seems unlikely that philosophers working on their own will be able to assuage skepticism of this sort: coming up with the right kinds of institutional proposal seems like a task which would demand kinds of expertise which are not always best promoted by philosophical reflection. Nevertheless, three points seem worth making.
	First, the schematic nature of the proposal should not be exaggerated. It is natural to compare it unfavorably with a view on which correlative obligation-bearers are states, on the grounds that states as they actually exist have institutions and mechanisms that allow many of the health-care needs of their citizens to be met. But it would be a stretch to infer from that, that a defender of CDB 2 can help themselves to an account which ensures that obligations to meet those health care needs which need to be met as a matter of justice fall determinately on some determinate and appropriately picked-out obligation-bearer. For in order to infer this, the advocate of CDB 2 would need to be in a position to assure us that the health-care systems distribute the burdens entailed by meeting those needs justly. And showing this would be a non-negligible task.
	Secondly the idea that there are no forms of organization that would enable the relevant obligations to be carried out seems implausibly strong. The plausibility of CDB 1  as a philosophical starting point seems to depend at least in part on the fact The fact that many wealthy, well-organized states seem sufficientlyreasonably capable of meeting health-related obligations towards their citizens, , to makes CDB 1 seem plausible as a philosophical starting point This suggests that ground for such skepticism about whether we could build institutions that met everyone’s health needs are limited. However, there is no reason to think that the existing system of states, unmodified, or the existing global political order is the form of organization that is most likely to be best suited to enabling the members of the global collective to satisfy the human right to health. Perhaps the modifications that our existing institutional framework will require will be comparatively modest. Maybe a system of transnational institutions working within relatively familiar frameworks will be enough. Perhaps it will not. We are unlikely to find out unless we engage in the business of trying to come up with the right kind of institutions.   
	But even in the absence of detailed institutional proposals, however, it seems reasonable to think we have made some significant philosophical progress. The line of argument that we have been examining helps us to see where the skeptical argument went wrong. It explains both why a principle like EQ might seem plausible, (and what it gets right), and why it goes wrong. For EQ is exactly the kind of principle that one might arrive at if one thought that the existing system of states was the right kind of organizational framework for addressing the obligations arising out of a human right to health. What EQ gets right is that everyone has an equal claim on whatever institutional framework there is for fulfilling the obligations which arise out of the human right to health. What it gets wrong is the form this institutional framework should take.

7: Addressing Some Objections
This defense of the right to health seems likely to provoke several different kinds of objections. Space precludes dealing with them all in detail, but it may be worth indicating the direction that responses to them might take, not least because the appeal to a global collective provides for a line of response which is not so obviously available to one popular, and superficially similar kind of response to the same objection: namely, the appeal to what is sometimes called “progressive realization”. 
A number of significant objections to the view I have defended depend on the idea that I have misconstrued what the correlativity thesis requires (or what we should take it to require.) Thus, for example, some might suggest that the correlativity thesis is best understood as the idea that genuine rights should be justiciable: that is to say, that they should impose specific obligations on particular individuals within a particular institutional and legal framework. If this is taken to mean that rights must be justiciable within an existing institutional framework, it imposes a requirement which no defender of the view that there are natural rights of any sort ought to accept. For we can imagine situations in which even the kinds of negative rights which proponents of the correlativity thesis take to be uncontroversial are not justiciable (for example, because there is no effective legal system.) 
A more plausible treatment of the justiciability requirement might require that any right be justiciable within some feasible legal and institutional framework. Some might worry that this weaker requirement might raise problems for the existence of a right to health: they might think that the nature of health as a good prevents it from being justiciable. But this is a very strong claim, (since it makes claims about all feasible institutional systems) and requires a correspondingly robust argument in its support. And the existence of legal systems which have successfully incorporated a justiciable right to health, such as the South African one, should undermine any confidence we might have that arguments of this sort are likely to be forthcoming.​[24]​
Rights that are not justiciable are sometimes dismissed as being, merely “manifesto rights”. Again it is worth distinguishing a more plausible and a less plausible version of this complaint. On one understanding of the accusation the complaint reduces to the idea that rights of this sort are not currently justiciable, an objection that I have said we should reject. This is connected with the idea of a manifesto conceived of as a political program that aims at realizing certain goals. So understood, there is nothing wrong with manifestoes. However the objection to manifesto rights might be understood more sympathetically as objecting to giving a pre-eminent status to certain kinds of goods which do not deserve that status, but should rather be understood as worth promoting in ways which involve balancing them against other goods. (We might conceivably see a supposed right to the highest possible level economic development as being appropriately subject to criticism along these lines.) But it is not clear that health should be understood as the kind of good which has this status. One might instead see health as the kind of good which gives rise to what Henry Shue has called a “Basic Right”: that is to say, as something whose absence makes our possession of other kinds of rights precarious. ​[25]​  
A more substantial kind of objection alleges that the kinds of obligation for whose existence I have argued are the wrong kinds of obligation to satisfy the demands of the correlativity thesis. The objection might be that the obligations are obligations falling on the wrong bearers, that they give rise to obligations with the wrong kinds of objects, or that they are simply the wrong kinds of obligations (for example, they are imperfect rather than perfect obligations.) Objections of this sort are, as I have already mentioned, often raised against so-called “progressive realization” responses to objections to positive rights based on the correlativity thesis.​[26]​ Such responses typically involve appeal to the idea that in situations where there is no institutional framework which could make justiciable the kinds of obligations to which positive rights would give rise where such institutions existed, the correlative duty to which such obligations give rise is in fact a duty to promote and support such institutions. 
Against this line of response it can be objected vVarious objections can be made to this responsely; Ffirst, one might hold  that the correlative obligations of which the correlativity thesis can only be regarded as correlative to a right to health (rather than say, a putative right to support of an institutional framework) if they give rise to obligations which, if satisfied would secure the health of the individual whose right was in question – that is to say, that the obligations are obligations with the wrong objects.; Ssecondly one might argue that these obligations that they fall on wrong kinds of individuals - those, say who have the resources to devote to activist causes – that is to say, on the wrong bearers,; and fFinally, one might worry that obligations to support certain institutions are best understood as imperfect obligations - that is to say obligations where the fact that there is some indeterminacy as to what would count as fulfilling the obligation gives rise to a certain kind of discretion on the part of the obligation bearer as to how to integrate plans of action through which their compliance with that obligation is expressed or manifested with other plans that make up a full life – whereas the obligations correlative to rights are perfect obligations which allow no such discretion. ​[27]​   
In order to see how the global obligations approach deals with this family of objections, it is worth emphasizing a feature which distinguishes it from other kinds of progressive realization approaches. On this account, a key point is that the obligation correlative to the right to health is an obligation which falls, not on individuals, but on the global collective. Although this obligation gives rise, in ways which I have already indicated, to obligations on individuals, it is not these obligations, but the obligation which falls on the global collective, which grounds them, which that is the actual correlative obligation. Moreover, this obligation, though not the others that arise from it, is an obligation to provide health: it is not itself an obligation to support institutions, although it gives rise to such an obligation. And finally, there is no reason why we should not see this obligation – although again, not the obligations on individuals that arise out of it – as being a perfect obligation. In other words, the obligation which, on this approach, we take to be correlative to the right to health is anare obligations of the right sort, and with the right object. Furthermore, it is anthey are obligations with whose bearer the right-holder has a natural and clearn especially intimate connection – a point which addresses the worry that, on the progressive realization approach, the obligations generated by the right to health might be ones whose connection with the rights holder is arbitrary and tenuous.  
So the Global Obligations account has the resources to deal with objections based on the way in which it deals with the correlativity thesis. However, there is another kind of objection, which could be seen as being closely related to this family of objections about which it might be worth saying more. One objection which I considered was that the kinds of obligations on individuals to which the right to health gave rise are obligations with the wrong kinds of objects: obligations to build institutions, rather than to get on with the urgent business of providing health care to those most urgently in need.​[28]​ My earlier response focused on shifting attention away from individual obligations bearers to the bearer of a collective obligation. And this seems an adequate response to someone whose objection is the purely formal one that a right to some good ought to give rise to an obligation to provide that very good. But the objection might instead be seen as a more practical one: namely that a focus on building the right kinds of institutions might distract us from taking measures that actually have some prospect of improving people”’s health. 
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